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Game-based coalescence over multi-agent
systems
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Abstract
Coalescence, as a kind of ubiquitous group behavior in the nature and society, means that agents,
companies or other substances keep consensus in states and act as a whole. This paper considers
coalescence for n rational agents with distinct initial states. Considering the rationality and intellectuality
of the population, the coalescing process is described by a bimatrix game which has the unique mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium solution. Since the process is not an independent stochastic process, it is
difficult to analyze the coalescing process. By using the first Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we prove that all
agents will coalesce into one group with probability one. Moreover, the expected coalescence time is
also evaluated. For the scenario where payoff functions are power functions, we obtain the distribution
and expected value of coalescence time. Finally, simulation examples are provided to validate the
effectiveness of the theoretical results.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, group behaviors of individuals have attracted the attention of many disciplines, such
as sociology[1], economics[2], [3], biology[4] and engineering[5]. Roughly speaking, group be-
haviors of multiple agents include consensus[6], flocking[7], containment[8], leader emergence[9],
[10] and so on. Among above aspects of group behavior, how to make a group of individuals
reaching consensus is a fundamental and important issue. Consensus means that agents reach
an agreement upon certain quantities of interest, such as opinions of social individuals[1], [11],
and speeds of mobile autonomous robots[12]. Many results were obtained, to name but a few,
leader-following consensus[13], consensus problems for multiple double-integrator agents[14],
[15] and for agents with different dynamics[16], [17], [18].
The above literature mostly assumed that each agent is simple, and thereby just obeies a
uniform rule without figuring out its own interest. However, in the real world, one noteworthy
feature is that agents are diverse. For example, they have different objectives or interests.
Another prominent feature of agents is of high intelligence — they choose the best possible
response based on their interests. Thus, the relationships among agents might be noncooperative,
even competitive, and the interaction of them might be playing games instead of obeying the
fixed protocols. Based on game theory, some complex group behavior, such as competitive
propagation[2], [19], network formation[20], collective learning[4] and coalescence [21], were
studied. To achieve a global task, agents need to coalesce, i.e., to form a group where they can
make decisions together and act as a whole. Coalescence is common seen in real world, such
as coalescence for robot groups [22] and coalescence of opinions in social networks[21], [23].
Inspired by the above references, we consider coalescence of n agents with distinct initial
states. It means that agents will finally keep consensus in states and act as a whole. It is necessary
to mention the difference between consensus and coalescence. Consensus means agents’ states
reach or asymptotically converge to an identical value. Whereas, coalescence is more complicated
than consensus. To reach coalescence, agents need to reach an agreement on states in the finite
time, and from then on alway keep consensus not only in states but also in action. Therefore,
the essential question we face is, how to design a mechanism to make agents coalesce into a
group. We assume that each agent is rational and accesses complete information, i.e., each agent
chooses the best response based on its interest and the global information of the population.
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3Based on this assumption, we propose a kind of bimatrix games where each player has two
strategies to choose – cooperation (C) and defection (D). Cooperation means players sacrifice
part of interests and change their states to achieve coalescence. On the contrary, defection means
players tend to keep their states regardless of whether coalescing or not. By playing this game,
agents coalesce into groups, then the agents in the same group act as a whole and play games
with those in other groups. By merging groups and groups, they eventually coalesce into one
group. We find that the game has the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium — players choose
strategies in a probabilistic sense, which makes the coalescing process be a stochastic process.
Because it depends on payoff functions, it is not an independent stochastic process. As a result,
it is not easy to analyze the coalescence of the population. The contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows.
• We establish a kind of bimatrix game model to show the interaction among agents. We
prove that the game has the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution.
• By virtue of the first Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we prove that all the agents coalesce into one
group with probability one.
• The distribution and the expected of coalescence time are evaluated.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce some basic notions
of bimatrix game. Section III shows our main results. Numerical simulations are given in Section
IV to illustrate the effectiveness of theoretical results. Some conclusions are drawn in Section
V.
Throughout this paper, the following notations will be used: let R, R≥0 be the sets of real
numbers and nonnegative real numbers, respectively. Rn×m is the set of n × m real matrices.
In = {1, · · · , n} is an index set. For a random event A, P(A) means the probability of event
A. For a random variable S, E(S) and D(S) mean the expected value and the variance of S
respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. A brief introduction for bimatrix games
In this subsection, we introduce some basic notions about bimatrix game. For more details,
interested readers are referred to [24].
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4Suppose that two players P1 and P2 play a game. P1 has strategies r1, r2, · · · , rm, and P2 has
strategies c1, c2, · · · , cn. If P1 adopts the strategy ri and P2 adopts the strategy cj , then (ri, cj) is
a pair of pure strategies, and aij (respectively, bij) denotes the profit incurred to P1 (respectively,
P2). Each player seeks to maximum its own profit by independent and simultaneous decision.
This game is comprised of two (m × n)-dimensional matrices, A = {aij} and B = {bij},
with each pair of entries (aij , bij) denoting the payoff of the game corresponding to a particular
pair of decisions made by the players. Thus, this game is called the bimatrix game (A,B). A
pair of strategies {ri∗ , cj∗} is said to constitute a pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution to a
bimatrix game (A,B) if the following pair of inequalities is satisfied for all i ∈ Im, j ∈ In:

ai∗j∗ ≥ aij∗,
bi∗j∗ ≥ bi∗j .
Furthermore, the pair (ai∗j∗ , bi∗j∗) is known as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the bimatrix game. In many cases, pure strategy Nash equilibrium strategies might not exist.
Hence, we now enlarge the concepts of strategy and Nash equilibrium, which are defined as
the set of all probability distributions on the set of pure strategies of each player. We call
Γ1 = {r1, r2, · · · , rm} and Γ2 = {c1, c2, · · · , cn} are the strategy spaces of players P1 and P2,
respectively. Let α = [α1, · · · , αm]
T be a non-negative vector satisfying
∑m
i=1 αi = 1, where αi
denotes player P1 will choose strategy ri with probability αi. Obviously, α is the probability
distribution of the strategy space Γ1. We define that α is a mixed strategy of P1. Likewise,
β = [β1, · · · , βn]
T is a mixed strategy of P2. Suppose that the game is played repeatedly, and
the outcomes which are maximized by players is determined by averaging the outcomes of the
player. Hence, we call (α, β) as a pair of mixed strategies, and U1(α, β) = α
TAβ and U2 =
(α, β) = αTBβ as the corresponding utilities of P1 and P2, respectively. Each player decides
its mixed strategy independently to maximize its utility. Subsequently, we give the definition of
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium[24].
Definition 1: A mixed strategy pair {α∗, β∗} is said to constitute a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium solution to a bimatrix game (A,B), if the following inequalities are satisfied for
all mixed strategy pairs:
(α∗)TAβ∗ ≥ αTAβ∗,
(α∗)TBβ∗ ≥ (α∗)TBβ.
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5B. The first Borel-Cantelli lemma
At the end of this section, we introduce the first Borel-Cantelli lemma which will be used in
our paper.
Lemma 1: (The first Borel-Cantelli lemma[25] )Let {Ak, k ≥ 1} be arbitrary events. If the
sum of the probabilities of the Ak is finite, then the probability that infinitely many of them
occur is 0, that is, P(∪∞l=1 ∪
∞
k≥l Ak) = 0.
III. Coalescence of multiple agents
Consider a system with n agents labeled 1, 2, · · · , n where each agent i (i ∈ In) has the state
xi(k) ∈ R
m at time k = 0, 1, · · · . Throughout this paper, we assume that
Assumption 1: All agents are rational and complete information accessible.
Assumption 2: At time k = 0, each agent composes one group and has a distinctive state, i.e.,
xi(0) 6= xj(0) for all i 6= j.
Assumption 3: Agents who are in the same group will make decisions together, share infor-
mation simultaneously and keep consensus on states.
In this paper, we consider how to make n agents coalescing, i.e., merging into one group
where they can make decisions together, share information simultaneously and keep consensus
on states. We first propose the notion of coalescence for the system.
Definition 2: For a multi-agent system composed of n agents with distinct initial states, if
there exists a minimum time K∗ such that, starting from time K∗, all agents make decisions
together, share information simultaneously and keep consensus on states, then the system is said
to reach coalescence at time K∗. Random variable K∗ is called the coalescence time of the
system. E(K∗) is called the expected coalescence time.
A. The interaction among groups
In this subsection, we propose a bimatrix gameG to model the interaction of groups. Moreover,
the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution of game G is obtained.
Players: There are two players P1 and P2. Players decide whether or not to change their
states by playing games. Let the states of P1 and P2 before game be y1 and y2 and after game
be y′1 and y
′
2 respectively (yr, y
′
r ∈ R
m, r = 1, 2).
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6Strategies: Each player has two strategies to choose from— cooperation (C) and defection
(D). If a player chooses C, it means this player will change its state to coalesce with the other
player. If a player chooses D, this agent will not change its state regardless of whether they
can coalesce or not. Therefore, there are four strategy pairs and the corresponding out-comings
(presented in Table I and Fig. 1):
• If both two players choose C, i.e., the strategy pair (C,C), both of them will update states
to the middle of their states to coalesce into a group;
• If one player chooses C and the other chooses D, i.e., the strategy pair (C,D) or (D,C),
only the cooperative player will change its state to that of the other one’s and they coalesce
into a group;
• If both two players choose D, i.e., the strategy pair (D,D), no one will change its state
and thereby merging fails.
Payoff: Each player will face two kinds of interests— cost of state changing and profit of
coalescence. For player Pr(r = 1, 2), the cost of state changing is f(||y
′
r − yr||), and the profit
of coalescence is g(||y1−y2||), where f : R≥0 7→ R≥0 and g : R≥0 7→ R≥0 are strictly monotone
increasing continuous functions with f(0) = g(0) = 0. Therefore, the payoff of player Pr is
g(||y1 − y2||)− f(||y
′
r − yr||).
Suppose that two players choose strategies independently and simultaneously. Let ξ = ||y1 −
y2||. The strategy pairs, outcomes, and payoffs of the game are listed in Table I.
TABLE I
THE OUTCOMES AND PAYOFFS OF THE GAME G.
(s1, s2) Outcomes of states Payoff of P1 Payoff of P2
(C,C) y′1 = y
′
2 =
y1+y2
2
g(ξ)− f( ξ
2
) g(ξ)− f( ξ
2
)
(C,D) y′1 = y
′
2 = y2 g(ξ)− f(ξ) g(ξ)
(D,C) y′1 = y
′
2 = y1 g(ξ) g(ξ)− f(ξ)
(D,D) y′1 = y1, y
′
2 = y2 0 0
Remark 1: Easy to find that the game will represent a prisoner’s dilemma if f(ξ) > g(ξ),
i.e., each player will choose D, which means that all agents always keep their initial states.
Therefore, in the remaining parts of the paper we assume that f(ξ) < g(ξ).
October 8, 2019 DRAFT
7y'1 = y
'
2 =
y1+y2
2
，
y1'=y2'=y1
（D，C）
Fig. 1. Four strategy pairs and out-comings of Game G
Theorem 1: Game G has the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution, that is each
player choosing C with probability
f(ξ)−g(ξ)
g(ξ)−f(ξ)+f( ξ
2
)
and D with probability
f( ξ
2
)
g(ξ)−f(ξ)+f( ξ
2
)
.
Proof. According to the definition of bimatrix game, game G is a bimatrix game where Γ1 =
Γ2 = {C,D} and
A =

g(ξ)− f( ξ2) g(ξ)− f(ξ)
g(ξ) 0

 , B = AT .
Let α = [p, 1− p]T and β = [q, 1− q]T be the mixed strategies of P1 and P2, respectively. Then,
the utilities of P1 and P2 are U1(p, q) = [p, 1−p]A[q, 1−q]
T and U2(p, q) = [p, 1−p]B[q, 1−q]
T .
Suppose that {[p∗, 1 − p∗]T , [q∗, 1− q∗]T} is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution of
the game G. By the definition of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, we have

U1(p
∗, q∗) ≥ U1(p, q
∗)
U2(p
∗, q∗) ≥ U2(p
∗, q)
,
which means that 

∂U1(p, q
∗)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗
= 0,
∂U2(p
∗, q)
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q∗
= 0.
(1)
By solving (1), we have p∗ = q∗ = g(ξ)−f(ξ)
g(ξ)−f(ξ)+f( ξ
2
)
. Hence, we know that the Nash equilibrium
solution in the mixed strategies is that each player chooses C with probability
g(ξ)−f(ξ)
g(ξ)−f(ξ)+f( ξ
2
)
and
D with probability
f( ξ
2
)
g(ξ)−f(ξ)+f( ξ
2
)
. 
Corollary 1: Two players will coalesce into one bigger group with probability 1−
(
f( ξ
2
)
g(ξ)−f(ξ)+f( ξ
2
)
)2
.
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8Group  A
Group B
Game   
(C,C),
 (C,D),
(D,C)
(D,D)
Group   A Group B
Group A and
Group B 
coalesce
into one new 
group.
Group A and Group B fail to
coalesce.
xi(k)
xj(k)
y1=xi(k)
y2=xj(k)
xi(k+1)=y1'
xj(k+1)=y2'
Fig. 2. the dynamic of the system
Proof. By the definition of the game, we know that two players will coalesce if and only if
y′1 = y
′
2. It is easy to find from Table 1 that
P(y′1 = y
′
2) = 1−
(
f( ξ
2
)
g(ξ)− f(ξ) + f( ξ
2
)
)2
. 
The interaction among groups can be described in the following manner (See Fig. 2): at
each time k, two groups are chosen to play the game G, where all involved agents will update
their states according to the rules of game G. If merger occurs in the game G, two groups will
coalesce into one group.
Remark 2: Since each member of a group has the same state, they have the same interest.
Therefore, we assume that strategy selection is determined by all agents of the group. Agents,
who make decisions together, obtain the identical payoff simultaneously. Suppose that two groups
consist of s1 agents and s2 agents respectively. Define
U (k)(p∗, q∗) = s1U1(p
∗, q∗) + s2U2(p
∗, q∗)
as the aggregate expectational payoff of two groups at time k.
B. Coalescence of multiple agents: general cases
Let ξk = |y1(k) − y2(k)| where y1(k) and y2(k) represent the states of two players before
playing game G at time k. Then, we can calculate
U (k)(p∗, q∗) = (s1 + s2)
(g(ξk)− f(ξk))g(ξk)
g(ξk)− f(ξk) + f(
ξk
2
)
.
Let pk indicate the probability of “two players coalesce at time k”. Then, we have pk = 1 −(
f(
ξk
2
)
g(ξk)−f(ξk)+f(
ξk
2
)
)2
.
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9Lemma 2: For the initial states x1(0), . . . , xn(0), there exist two positive constants 0 < plow <
pup < 1 such that plow ≤ pk ≤ pup for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K
∗.
Proof. For the initial states x1(0), . . . , xn(0), we have
ξmin ≤ ξk ≤ ξmax.
where ξmin = mini,j∈{1,2,...,n} |xi(0)− xj(0)| and
ξmax = max
i,j∈{1,2,...,n}
|xi(0)− xj(0)|.
Since f(.) and g(.) are continuous,
f( ξ
2
)
g(ξ)−f(ξ)+f( ξ
2
)
is also continuous in [ξmin, ξmax]. It is easy to
obtain that, there exist two positive constants 0 < ν < µ < 1 such that 0 < ν ≤
f( ξ
2
)
g(ξ)−f(ξ)+f( ξ
2
)
≤
µ < 1 for all ξk ∈ [ξmin, ξmax]. Thus, we have 1− µ
2 = plow < pk < pup = 1− ν
2. 
Theorem 2: If Assumptions 1 - 3 hold and all groups interact by playing game G, then the
probability with which the coalescence time equals to T (≥ n− 1) can be estimated by
Cn−2T−1(1− pup)
T+1−npn−1low ≤ P(K
∗ = T ) ≤ Cn−2T−1(1− plow)
T+1−npn−1up . (2)
Moreover, the expected coalescence time can be estimated by
(n− 1)
pn−1low
pnup
≤ E(K∗) ≤ (n− 1)
pn−1up
pnlow
.
Proof. We know that the number of groups will decrease by 1 at the time k if two players coalesce
into one group. Let ∆k indicate whether two players coalesce at time k = 1, 2, · · · or not, i.e.,
∆k =


1, players coalesce at time k,
0, otherwise.
By the definition of ∆k and K
∗, it is easy to know that
{K∗ = T} = {∆T = 1,
T−1∑
k=1
∆k = n− 2}.
Consequently,
P(K∗ = T ) = P(∆T = 1|
T−1∑
k=1
∆k = n− 2)P(
T−1∑
k=1
∆k = n− 2). (3)
By Lemma 2, we have
plow ≤ P(∆k = 1|∆k−1 = δk−1, . . . ,∆1 = δ1) ≤ pup
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and
1− pup ≤ P(∆k = 0|∆k−1 = δk−1, . . . ,∆1 = δ1) ≤ 1− plow
for all T − 1 ≤ k ≤ 1. Because
P(∆T−1 = δT−1, . . . ,∆1 = δ1)
= P(∆T−1 = δT−1|∆T−2 = δT−2, . . . ,∆1 = δ1) · · ·P(∆2 = δ2|∆1 = δ1)P(∆1 = δ1),
we have
(1− pup)
T+1−npn−2low ≤ P(∆T−1 = δT−1, . . . ,∆1 = δ1) ≤ (1− plow)
T+1−npn−2up
for all
∑T−1
k=1 δk = n− 2. Then, it follows from
P(
T−1∑
k=1
∆k = n− 2) =
∑
∑T−1
k=1
δk=n−2
P(∆T−1 = δT−1, . . . ,∆1 = δ1)
that
Cn−2T−1(1− pup)
T+1−npn−2low ≤ P(
T−1∑
k=1
∆k = n− 2) ≤ C
n−2
T−1(1− plow)
T+1−npn−2up .
By Lemma 2, we have
plow ≤ P(∆T = 1|
T−1∑
k=1
∆k = n− 2) ≤ pup.
Therefore, (2) holds.
One knows that
∞∑
T=n−1
TCn−2T−1(1− pup)
T+1−npn−1low ≤ E(K
∗) ≤
∞∑
T=n−1
TCn−2T−1(1− plow)
T+1−npn−1up .
Denote s = T − n + 1. It follows from
∞∑
T=n−1
Cn−1T (1− pup)
T+1−n =
∞∑
s=0
Css+n−1(1− pup)
s = p−nup
that
∞∑
T=n−1
TCn−2T−1(1− pup)
T+1−npn−1low =
∞∑
T=n−1
(n− 1)Cn−1T p
n−1
low (1− pup)
T+1−n = (n− 1)
pn−1low
pnup
.
Similarly, we have
(n− 1)
pn−1low
pnup
≤ E(K∗) ≤ (n− 1)
pn−1up
pnlow
. 
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Theorem 3: If Assumptions 1 - 3 hold and all groups interact by playing game G, then the
system reaches coalescence with probability 1.
Proof. Let Ak be the event that all agents do not coalesce into one group at time k. It follows
that the event “all agents do not coalesce into one group” is ∪∞l=1 ∪
∞
k≥l Ak. It is easy to find
that Ak = {
∑k
t=1 ∆t < n− 1}. By Theorem 2, we have

P(Ak) = 1, k = 0, 1, · · · , n− 2,
P(Ak) = P
(
k∑
t=1
∆t < n− 1
)
≤
n−2∑
s=0
Cskp
s
up(1− plow)
k−s,
k = n− 1, n, · · · .
For k > n− 1,
n−2∑
s=0
Csk+1p
s
up(1− plow)
k+1−s =
n−2∑
s=0
(1− plow)
k + 1
k + 1− s
Cskp
s
up(1− plow)
k−s
<
(k + 1)(1− plow)
k + 1− (n− 2)
n−2∑
s=0
Cskp
s
up(1− plow)
k−s.
(4)
We know that
(1− plow)
k + 1
k + 1− (n− 2)
< 1−
plow
2
< 1 (5)
holds for all k > (n− 2)( 2
plow
− 1)− 1. Let K0 = max{(n− 2)(
2
plow
− 1), n− 1}. It follows from
(4) and (5) that
∞∑
k=K0
n−2∑
s=0
Cskp
s
up(1− plow)
k−s <
∞∑
l=0
n−2∑
s=0
(1−
plow
2
)lCsK0p
s
up(1− plow)
K0−s
=
2
plow
n−2∑
s=0
CsK0p
s
up(1− plow)
K0−s <∞.
Thus, we have
∞∑
k=0
P(Ak) =
∑
k<K0
P(Ak) +
∑
k≥K0
P(Ak)
≤
∑
k<K0
P(Ak) +
∞∑
k=K0
n−2∑
s=0
Cskp
s
up(1− plow)
k−s
<
∑
k<T
P(Ak) +
2
plow
n−2∑
s=0
CsK0p
s
up(1− plow)
K0−s <∞.
By Lemma 1, we know that P(∪∞l=1 ∪
∞
k≥l Al) = 0, which means that the system will reach
coalescence with probability 1. 
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C. Coalescence of multiple agents: special cases
Generally speaking, ∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆K∗ are not independent, i.e., the results of game G at
time 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 influence that of at time k. However, if pk is independent from ξk, then
∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆K∗ are independent. We have the following results.
Theorem 4: If g(ξ) = θξλ and f(ξ) = cg(ξ)(λ > 0, θ > 0, 0 < c < 1), then
1) ∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆K∗ are independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables, and the
distribution of ∆k is
P(∆k = 1) = pˆ,P(∆k = 0) = qˆ,
where pˆ = 1−
(
c
2λ(1−c)+c
)2
and qˆ = 1− pˆ;
2) the distribution of K∗ is
P(K∗ = T ) = Cn−2T−1pˆ
n−1qˆT−(n−1), T = n− 1, n, · · · ;
3) E(K∗) = n−1
pˆ
,D(K∗) = (n−1)qˆ
pˆ2
.
Proof. From Corollary 1, we have
pk = 1−
(
f( ξk
2
)
g(ξk)− f(ξk) + f(
ξk
2
)
)2
.
Easy to find that pk = pˆ, which is independent from ξk. As a result, ∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆K∗ are
independent and P(∆k = 1) = pˆ.
Since ∆1 ∆2, · · · ,∆K∗ are i.i.d. random variables. We have
P(K∗ = T ) = P(∆T = 1,
T−1∑
i=1
∆i = n− 2)
= P(∆T = 1)P(
T−1∑
i=1
∆i = n− 2)
=


0, k = 0, 1, · · · , n− 2,
Cn−2T−1pˆ
n−1qˆT−1−(n−2), T = n− 1, n, · · · .
It follows that the expectation of K∗ is
E(K∗) =
∞∑
T=n−1
TCn−2T−1pˆ
n−1qˆT−(n−1).
Using the similar argument in Theorem 2, we have
E(K∗) =
n− 1
pˆ
.
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We can also show that
E((K∗)2) =
∞∑
T=n−1
T 2Cn−2T−1pˆ
n−1qˆT−(n−1).
Let s = T − n+ 1, we obtain
E((K∗)2) = (n− 1)pˆn−1
∞∑
s=0
(s+ n− 1)Css+n−1qˆ
s
= (n− 1)pˆn−1
[
n
∞∑
s=0
Css+nqˆ
s −
∞∑
s=0
Css+n−1qˆ
s
]
=
n(n− 1)
pˆ2
−
n− 1
pˆ
.
Therefore, we have D(K∗) = (n−1)qˆ
pˆ2
. 
The expected coalescence time can measure how fast all agents coalesce into one group. By
Theorem 4, we have the following result.
Corollary 2: If g(ξ) = θξλ and f(ξ) = cg(ξ)(λ > 0, θ > 0, 0 < c < 1), then E(K∗) is a
strictly monotone increasing function of c.
Proof. By pˆ = 1 −
(
c
2λ(1−c)+c
)2
, we can find that pˆ is a strictly monotonic decreasing function
of c. And E(K∗) is a strictly monotone decreasing function of pˆ. Therefore, E(K∗) is a strictly
monotone increasing function of c. 
At time k, the game G is played by two groups with size s1 and s2. When g(ξ) = θξ
λ and
f(ξ) = cg(ξ)(λ > 0, θ > 0, 0 < c < 1), the aggregate expectational payoff of all agents is
U (k)(p∗, q∗) = (s1 + s2)
2λ(1−c)θξλ
2λ(1−c)+c
.
IV. SIMULATIONS
Suppose that there are 20 agents with distinct initial states. Firstly, we let g(ξ) = 0.8ξ and
f(ξ) = 6
8
g(ξ). In Fig.3, we show the process of coalescing by presenting the groups at time
when merging event happens. Since agents from the same group have the same state, each dot
indicates one group. In order to show the process clearly, we use bigger dots to indicate groups
with more agents. It is shown that, when two groups play game G and coalesce into a bigger
one, the number of groups shrinks by 1. Moreover, some groups become bigger and bigger as
time goes by. The system reaches coalescence at time 30.
Secondly, We simulate 20000 times with the same initial states. It is shown that each time the
system always achieves coalescence in the finite time. Moreover, we also get the frequency
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Fig. 3. The process of coalescing. Each figure indicates states of agents after two groups coalesce into one. Since the states
of agents from one group are the same, each dot also indicates one group. We use bigger dots to indicate groups with more
agents. It is easy to find that the numbers of groups decreases by 1 at each time. Moreover, some groups become bigger and
bigger as time goes by. Finally, all agents coalesce into one big group at time 30.
of coalescence time K∗ over those 20000 times simulations. The comparison between the
distribution and the frequency of K∗ is shown in Fig. 4. Those results manifest the effectiveness
of theoretical results in Theorems 3 and 4.
Thirdly, we let g(ξ) = 0.8ξ and f(ξ) = 5
8
g(ξ). Then we do the same simulations. The
comparison between the distribution and the frequency ofK∗ is shown in Fig. 5. Easy to find from
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 that the system is more likely reaching coalescence earlier when g(ξ) = 0.8ξ
and f(ξ) = 5
8
g(ξ). Those results manifest the effectiveness of theoretical results in Corollary 2.
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Fig. 4. The distribution and the frequency of K∗ with f(ξ) = 0.6ξ and g(ξ) = 0.8ξ
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Fig. 5. The distribution and the frequency of K∗ with f(ξ) = 0.5ξ and g(ξ) = 0.8ξ
V. CONCLUSION
To achieve some global tasks, multiple agents need to coalesce into one group — they will
make decisions together, share information instantly, keep consensus in states. This paper focused
on the coalescence of a population of rational and complete information accessible agents. We
modeled the coalescing process as a repeated bimatrix game. Agents form groups and groups
coalesce into one bigger group. We proved that coalescence will be reached with probability one
and gave an estimation for the expected coalescence time. Moreover, when payoff functions are
power functions, the distribution of coalescence time was obtained. Future work might contain
the coalescence under partial information or under learning mechanisms.
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